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ACCESS TO RESEARCH DATA:
RECONCILING RISKS AND BENEFITS
Eleanor Singer, Ph.D.*
INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the National Research Council of the National
Academy of Sciences established the Panel on Data Access for
Research Purposes to “assess competing approaches to exploiting
the research potential of microdata . . . while preserving
confidentiality.”1 The panel was asked to consider the tradeoffs
between the risks and benefits of access to research data and to
make recommendations about “how microdata should optimally
(from a societal standpoint) be made available to researchers.”2 As
the panel’s chair, I drew heavily on its final report for this article,
but the views expressed are my own, not those of the panel or of
the Academy.
In the present context, “research data” refers to information
collected from individuals, households, firms, and other
organizations for exclusively statistical purposes under a pledge of
confidentiality. Confidentiality means that the information will not
be disclosed in identifiable form to an unauthorized party.3
Examples of information collected exclusively for statistical
purposes include: (1) the information collected in the decennial
census; (2) the monthly employment data collected by the U.S.
Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics; and (3) the
* Research Professor, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.
1
PANEL ON DATA ACCESS FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES, NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, EXPANDING ACCESS TO RESEARCH DATA: RECONCILING RISKS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2005) [hereinafter PANEL ON DATA ACCESS].
2
Id.
3
SYS. SEC. STUD. COMMITTEE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPUTERS AT
RISK: SAFE COMPUTING IN THE INFORMATION AGE 289 (1991).
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information obtained in the Health Interview Survey, also collected
by the Census Bureau. The purpose of such data collections is to
generate information about categories of persons or organizations,
such as children under the age of 18 or households with only one
parent present. Although policy decisions based on that
information may affect individual members of the category, no
direct action is taken for or against a specific individual or
organization on the basis of the information collected.
In contrast to data collected for statistical purposes,
information gathered for administrative purposes is expressly
designed to facilitate a course of action affecting a particular
person or organization.4 Examples of administrative data include
information required from individuals seeking to obtain a driver’s
license or to qualify for Medicare or Medicaid. Such data are not
collected under a pledge of confidentiality,5 and individuals have
no reasonable expectation of the data’s confidentiality.
Although administrative data are not the subject of the present
discussion, they become relevant to it when, as happens
increasingly often, they are linked to data collected for statistical
purposes under a pledge of confidentiality. To perform such
linkages the consent of the individual is ordinarily required, and
the linked administrative data become subject to the assurance of
confidentiality provided by the researcher.6
This article discusses the benefits and potential costs of access
to research data, ways of reconciling the two, and why it is
important to do so. I want to stress two main points. First, there are
competing claims in this arena between those who, for good
reasons, want easier access to research data, and those who, for
4

“Administrative purposes” may include regulatory, legislative, or judicial
purposes. PANEL ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND DATA ACCESS, NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES: CONFIDENTIALITY AND
ACCESSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT STATISTICS 24 (1993) [hereinafter PANEL ON
CONFIDENTIALITY AND DATA ACCESS].
5
Id. (“[T]he Privacy Act of 1974 defines a statistical record to be[:] a
record in a system of records maintained for statistical research or reporting
purposes only and not used in whole or in part in making any determination
about an identifiable individual.”) (emphasis added).
6
Cf. infra Part I.B.
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equally good reasons, are concerned that granting such access risks
harming not only individuals but the research enterprise itself.
Increasingly, the courts are going to be asked to adjudicate these
competing claims.
The second, and perhaps even more important point, is that
there are legal, technical, and administrative devices for managing
the tension between these competing claims. These devices may
not totally satisfy either privacy advocates or those who want fast
and free access to detailed information about individuals. But
given the benefits of both access and confidentiality protection, it
is important to make optimum use of all available tools.
Part I of this article provides an example of why issues of data
access are of interest to judges, and discusses recent legislation
affecting access to research data. Part II begins with some
examples of the uses of research data, and then discusses the
benefits and potential costs of expanded access as well as
technical, legal, and social changes that have increased the tension
between benefits and costs. Part III reviews the threats to
confidentiality posed by expanded access to research data, and
discusses a variety of technological, legal, and administrative
solutions.
I. WHY DATA ACCESS IS OF INTEREST TO JUDGES
A. Southern Illinoisan v. Department of Public Health
One reason judges should be concerned with issues of data
access is the recent Illinois Appellate Court decision, Southern
Illinoisan v. Department of Public Health.7 The Illinois
Department of Public Health appealed the Jackson County trial
court decision, which had ordered the disclosure of certain Illinois
Cancer Registry (Registry) information to the Southern Illinoisan,
a newspaper in Carbondale, Illinois, based upon a Freedom of

7

812 N.E.2d 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
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Information Act (FOIA) request.8 This was the second appeal from
the trial court’s decision; in the first, the Appellate Court held that
the phrase in the Illinois Health and Hazardous Substances
Registry Act,9 forbidding public inspection or dissemination of any
group of facts that would tend to identify persons in the Registry,
referred to any group of facts that “reasonably” would tend to
identify specific persons.10
On remand, the district court held hearings to determine if the
information sought by the newspaper would reasonably tend to
identify specific persons in the Registry. Latanya Sweeney, a
professor at Carnegie Mellon University, testified that using only
the information sought by the plaintiffs in the case—information
stripped of obvious identifiers like name and address—she was
able to identify 18 of 20 individuals exactly. She was also able to
supply two plausible alternative names for each of the remaining
two individuals.11
The Appellate Court nevertheless ordered defendants to turn
over the requested information, affirming the second trial court
decision. The court found that Dr. Sweeney’s knowledge and
analytical skill are “beyond that of the average person.”12 Thus, it
was not reasonable to believe that anyone “with less knowledge,
education, and experience than Dr. Sweeney”13 would be able to
identify individuals.14 But this kind of knowledge, while not
universal, is by no means arcane. Students at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, for example, performed a similar analysis
for individuals in Chicago’s Homicide Database.15
8

Id.
Illinois Health and Hazardous Substances Registry Act, 410 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 525/(d) (1998).
10
S. Illinoisan v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 747 N.E.2d 401 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001).
11
S. Illinoisan, 812 N.E.2d at 29.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 30.
14
Id.
15
S. OCHAS, ET AL., IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUALS IN CHICAGO’S
HOMICIDE DATABASE: A TECHNICAL AND LEGAL STUDY (2001) (unpublished
9
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B. Recent Federal Legislation Affecting Access To Research
Data
Another example of why judges should be interested in the
issues involved in access to research data is the relatively recent
passage of a federal law, the Confidential Information Protection
and Statistical Efficiency Act (CIPSEA).16 Subpart A of CIPSEA
creates equal confidentiality protection for all data collected by
federal agencies for exclusively statistical purposes under a pledge
of confidentiality, and it raises the level of protection for many of
them to that enjoyed previously only by the Census Bureau and the
National Center for Health Statistics. The law also protects such
information against FOIA requests.
The law’s protections also extend to contractual agents of the
federal agencies, who may be organizations or individual
researchers. Currently, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) is preparing regulations to implement the safeguards under
CIPSEA. These regulations are expected to define more precisely
both the reach of protection for confidential statistical records and
the opportunities for research access.
Under CIPSEA, willful disclosure of identifiable information
collected under a promise of confidentiality may result in a fine of
$250,000, five years imprisonment, or both. The law’s provisions,
however, have not yet been tested in court and the extent to which
they will prevail if they conflict with other laws and interests—for
example, national security concerns—remains to be seen.
Several other recently enacted laws—the USA PATRIOT Act
of 2001 (Patriot Act), the Shelby Amendment, and the Information
Quality Act—are relevant to the issue of data access.17
The Patriot Act18 overturned the strict confidentiality
manuscript, on file with the author).
16
See E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006).
17
The implications of an additional statute, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (2000), are beyond the scope
of this paper.
18
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of
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protection of education records gathered and maintained by the
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), a change in
protection that was later reflected in corresponding amendments to
the statute governing NCES. The Patriot Act allows the Attorney
General to petition a court for access to identifiable education
records, including research records, for use in the investigation and
prosecution of terrorist activities.
The Shelby Amendment also permits access to federal research
information for non-research purposes.19 The Amendment requires
OMB to set forth regulations to ensure that all data that are
supported by a federal grant to colleges, universities, hospitals and
other nonprofit institutions “will be made available to the public
through procedures established under the [FOIA].”20 The resulting
OMB guidelines restrict access to published or cited research that
has been used by the federal government to develop legally
binding regulations and rulings. The guidelines also provide an
exemption to access under FOIA for information that would result
in a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, such as
records that could be used to identify a particular person in a
research study.”21 CIPSEA supports the OMB’s interpretation of
the Amendment because it limits disclosure of confidential
information under FOIA as well. However, the validity of the
OMB guidelines and the CIPSEA restrictions have yet to be tested
through litigation.
Federal statistical agencies also confront increased scrutiny of
the quality of information that they disseminate to the public, even
if the data have not been used as part of the regulatory process. The

2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
19
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
20
Id. § 2681-495.
21
PANEL ON DATA ACCESS, supra note 1, at 24. For a detailed discussion of
this issue, see AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ENSURING THE QUALITY OF
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING THE
QUALITY OF DATA DISSEMINATED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: WORKSHOP
REPORT (2003).
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Information Quality Act,22 also known as the Data Quality Act,
directs OMB to issue guidelines for “ensuring and maximizing the
quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information
disseminated . . . by federal agencies”23 to the public, and requires
all federal agencies to establish administrative procedures for
correcting disseminated information that does not meet those
standards. The resulting OMB guidelines24 define “scientific
information” to include agency distribution of public use and
restricted use statistical datasets.25 “Influential scientific
information,” which is defined as information reasonably expected
to “have a clear and substantial impact on important public policies
or important private sector decisions,”26 must meet even higher
information quality standards. Agencies that disseminate
influential scientific information must first conduct a peer review
and reveal enough about the data and methods used to facilitate
independent reanalysis, while taking into account privacy,
confidentiality, and intellectual property rights. There is concern
among some researchers that the Data Quality Act, like the Shelby
Amendment, may be used by those opposed to certain policy
initiatives to challenge the findings and quality of research data as
a means of impeding agency regulatory activities. In 2003, some
19 federal agencies received data correction requests under the
Data Quality Act.27

22

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001 (commonly known as the
Information (or Data) Quality Act), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 515, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-153 (2000).
23
Id. § 515(a).
24
See OMB Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed.
Reg. 2664-02 (January 14, 2005).
25
Id. at 2667.
26
Id.
27
See Draft 2005 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal
Regulations, June 2005, at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/draft_
2005_cb_report.pdf.
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II. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EXPANDED ACCESS TO RESEARCH
DATA
A. The Uses of Research Data
It is hard to find a sector of society that does not make use of
research data in some way. First, of course, there is use by the
government itself, in its policy-formulating role. Public policies
often focus on population groups defined in terms of one or more
characteristics: low-income families, veterans, Medicare patients,
preschool children, drug addicts, and homeowners, to name a few
from a long list. Policy design proceeds on the basis of knowing
how many people there are in these groups; how they are
geographically distributed; and how they differ in other
characteristics. For example, how will changing the age of
eligibility for Social Security affect retirement decisions across
different occupations and regions of the country? Information
about the potential impact of such policy changes can influence the
legislation eventually adopted.28
Other public policies focus on public and private
establishments such as public schools, military bases, hospitals,
prisons, small businesses, health care providers, and financial
institutions. For establishments, too, complex policy-making
requires access to complex, multivariate microdata derived from
large-scale surveys of individuals and establishments. Access to
microdata—that is, individual-level information, as distinct from
aggregated summary data—provides the analytic flexibility needed
for sophisticated policy analysis and planning. At the same time,
access to microdata, especially microdata linked to administrative
records, such as Social Security earnings statements or Medicare
records, increases the probability that the confidentiality of the data
can be breached.29
The most important sources of the information used for policy
design, evaluation, and planning purposes are the more than 70
28
29

For other examples, see PANEL ON DATA ACCESS, supra note 1.
Id.
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federal agencies that carry out statistical activities of at least
$500,000 per year. In fiscal year 2004, these agencies were
authorized to spend about $4.8 billion for statistical programs to
serve the Nation’s informational needs.30 The agencies either
collect data themselves or, very commonly, contract with survey
organizations such as Westat or the National Opinion Research
Center (NORC) to collect the data for them.31 In addition, state
agencies also collect data needed to carry out state governmental
functions.
Social scientists, of course, are heavy producers as well as
consumers of such data, often with the aid of government grants or
contracts. Such surveys as the University of Michigan’s Health and
Retirement Study, a national longitudinal survey of some 12,000
Americans aged 50 and over, or the NORC’s General Social
Survey, a cross-sectional national survey of 3,000 Americans 18
and over, are done under the leadership of social scientists with
grants from the federal government, and are made available for use
by the research community and the general public. This last
statement—that research data are made widely available for
reanalysis by others—is key to the tension faced by data collection
agencies.
B. Benefits of Expanded Access to Research Data
There are many benefits of increasing access to research data;
three are discussed below.
First, primary data collection is increasingly expensive,
difficult, and burdensome and, thus, sharing data may reduce the
cost of collecting the information and alleviate some of the burden
on respondents. Because ours is a mobile society, whose members
carry out many activities outside the home, individuals are
30

U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2004, p. 7 (2003).
31
The list of federal agencies that gather data includes: the Census Bureau,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the National Center for Health Statistics, the
Centers for Disease Control, the National Institute of Drug and Alcohol Use, and
the National Center for Education Statistics.
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becoming more difficult to reach and, when reached, they are often
too busy to answer the researcher’s questions. But because
interviewing all persons who have been selected for a sample is
crucial for the validity of survey results, difficulties in reaching
potential respondents and persuading them to be interviewed mean
escalating survey costs.
Furthermore, the kinds of surveys carried out or sponsored by
government have become longer over time, and often inquire into
topics, such as health and financial status, that are considered
sensitive by respondents. As a result, surveys have become more
burdensome, further increasing their difficulty and cost. Sharing
research data by giving many researchers access to a single data set
increases the return on this increased investment.
Second, there is a benefit from sharing research data that
accrues to the statistical agencies themselves. When data are
shared with external researchers along with study results, the
agencies can improve their own data collection methods and
analytic capabilities. Faulty techniques that might not otherwise
have been discovered can be identified, and techniques that are
effective will be promoted. Researcher access also ensures that
additional information about statistical procedures, which might
otherwise not be completely documented by agencies, is archived.
Third, democratic societies require multiple perspectives
brought to bear on research data. Facts do not speak for
themselves. They are interpreted by analysts with different points
of view and, sometimes, different axes to grind. If access to data is
limited to those with only one point of view, there is no
opportunity for a critique of the policies that governments or
private industries develop. Broader access does not guarantee
better policy, but it does make possible an informed critique and
evaluation of whatever policies are adopted and their outcomes.
The current debate over Social Security is a case in point.
Competing analyses have produced significantly different
estimates of when the Social Security trust fund will run out of
money, how much is required to assure its solvency, and how
much various proposals, such as taxing incomes over $90,000 or
raising the retirement age, would contribute to reducing or
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eliminating the deficit.32
Finally, science, as well as policy, benefits from replication
because replication guards against both good-faith error and
deliberate fraud. It is often impossible, for a variety of reasons, to
produce a data set identical to one that was used to formulate a
theory or a practical policy. Because of this, it is essential that
scientists as well as policy makers have access to the original data
on which the policies or theories were based in order to replicate
the analyses that were carried out. Cyril Burt, for example, was
able to perpetuate his theory of the heritability of intelligence for
many years because only he had access to the disputed data set of
53 pairs of identical twins on which he based his claims.33
C. Potential Costs of Expanded Access to Research Data
One cost of providing unrestricted access to fully detailed
microdata is a potential breach of the data’s confidentiality. This
section considers the various ways in which confidentiality can be
breached. But first, it is important to consider why confidentiality
matters.
Confidentiality matters, in the first place, for the individual.
Much of the information requested by government statistical
agencies and their agents is sensitive for a variety of reasons. The
Health and Retirement Study, for example, obtains detailed
information from individuals about earnings and assets in order to
analyze the relationship between health, wealth, and retirement
decisions, which is the primary aim of the survey. But if the
information became known to unscrupulous outsiders, it might
32

See, e.g., CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, PROGRESSIVE GUIDE TO
SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE, http://www.americanprogress.org/site/
pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=289148; THE SOCIAL SECURITY NETWORK, A
CENTURY FOUNDATION PROJECT, http://www.socsec.org/; FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER 99-20 (June 25, 1999),
http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/wklyltr99/el99-20.html.
33
J. A. Plucker, Human intelligence: Historical Influences, Current
Controversies, Teaching Resources (2003), avilable at http://www.indiana.
edu/~intell (last visited June 16, 2005).
THE
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make respondents liable to fraud, theft, or other kinds of abuse.
To take another example, the National Institute for Drug and
Alcohol conducts detailed surveys of adolescent drug use for
epidemiological purposes. If adolescents honestly admit the use of
illegal drugs and if that information became known to law
enforcement agencies, they would be subject to legal sanctions.
There are numerous examples but the general point has been made:
if the information collected in many surveys became publicly
known, together with identifying information about the
respondents, respondents would be subject to a variety of harms
ranging from embarrassment to employment discrimination,
criminal victimization or imprisonment. A breach of
confidentiality and its potential consequences, in other words, is
probably the most serious risk to which participants in social
research—as opposed to biomedical research—are subject.
Individual harm, however, is not the only consequence of a
confidentiality breach—decreased participation in social research
may also result. Unlike much biomedical research, social research
depends on the voluntary cooperation of those selected, usually by
probability sampling methods, to participate. Biomedical
researchers assume that the individuals they study are homogenous
enough so that one person can be substituted for another. This is
not true in social research, where individual variation is precisely
the object of study.34 If significant elements of the population who
are designated for measurement refuse to cooperate, the inferences
drawn from the responses of those who do cooperate are likely to
be erroneous and misleading. There is evidence from a variety of
studies, most of them carried out in connection with the U.S.
decennial census, that public concerns about privacy and
confidentiality have increased significantly over the last decade,35
34

See, e.g., PANEL ON INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS, SURVEYS, AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROTECTING
PARTICIPANTS AND FACILITATING SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 102
(2003).
35
ELEANOR SINGER, US CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 TESTING,
EXPERIMENTATION, AND EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC REPORT NO. 1, TR-1,
PRIVACY RESEARCH IN CENSUS 2000 4-7, (2003), available at
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and that they significantly reduce cooperation. For example,
concerns about privacy and confidentiality significantly reduced
participation in the decennial censuses of 1990 and 2000.36 Smallscale experiments also demonstrate that the likelihood of
confidentiality breaches is perceived as an important risk by survey
respondents, and is significantly correlated with their decision
about whether or not to participate in nongovernmental surveys.37
This reluctance extends to other behaviors,38 for example,
providing one’s Social Security Number (SSN).39 Thus, there is
ample evidence that confidentiality breaches potentially harm both
the individual and the larger society.

http://www.census.gov/pred/www/rpts/TR-1.pdf.
36
See Eleanor Singer, et al., The Impact of Privacy and Confidentiality
Concerns On Survey Participation: The Case of the 1990 Census, 57 PUB.
OPINION Q. 465 (1993); Eleanor Singer, et al., Attitudes and Behavior: The
Impact of Privacy and Confidentiality Concerns on Participation in the 2000
Census, 65 PUB. OPINION Q. 368 (2003); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 2000
CENSUS: COUNTING UNDER ADVERSITY 2004; S. Hillygus, et al., Civic
Mobilization and Privacy Concerns in the 2000 Census (2006).
37
Eleanor Singer, Exploring the Meaning of Consent: Participation in
Research and Beliefs about Risks and Benefits, 19 J. OF OFFICIAL STAT. 273
(2003).
38
N. A. Bates, Development and Testing of Informed Consent Questions to
Link Survey Data with Administrative Records, AAPOR Annual Conference,
May 13, 2005.
39
Census Bureau efforts to obtain SSNs have become increasingly difficult
over the last few years. For example, in the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), SSN refusals increased from 12 percent to 35 percent
between the 1996 and 2001 panels, respectively. Email from Donna Ricinni,
Chief Income Surveys Programming Branch, U.S. Census Bureau to N. Bates
(Jan. 23, 2003) (on file with author); D. LEWIS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FINAL
PROJECT REPORT FOR IMPROVING SOCIAL SECURITY NU,MBER RESPONSE
STUDY, 2005 (on file with author). SSN refusals in the Current Population
Survey (CPS) increased from approximately ten percent in 1994 to almost 23
percent by 2003. R. TUCKER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RECENT CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEYS AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER REPORTING
EXPERIENCE, 1999; T. MARSHALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RECENT CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEYS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER REPORTING EXPERIENCE,
2004 (on file with author).

SINGER MACROED.DOC

98

4/6/2006 2:30 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
D. Technical, Legal and Social Changes That Have Increased
the Tension

The tension between access and confidentiality is not new. In
1985, a National Research Council (NRC) Panel issued a report
that focused primarily on the benefits of access.40 In 1993, another
NRC Panel issued a comprehensive report titled Private Lives and
Public Policies, which explicitly examined the various tensions
involved in making research data more widely available while
maintaining their confidentiality.41 Why, then, take another look at
the problem now? The reasons lie in the substantial changes,
primarily technological but also legal and social, that have taken
place in the last decade.
Undergirding all the other changes are the vast increases in
computing power and storage capacity that have taken place. The
information world now captures enormous numbers of records of
personal and organizational information, stores them in data
warehouses, analyzes them through sophisticated statistical and
data mining techniques, and disseminates the results
instantaneously through electronic communications media. The
explosion in information technology is evident at each stage of the
process of data capture, storage, integration, and dissemination,
and can be measured by the reduced cost of each of these
activities. For example, the NRC noted in 2005:
[O]ne terabyte of storage can hold the contents of 2,000 file
cabinets of documents. Ten years ago, such storage would
have cost $1 million; now it can be obtained for less than
$800. . . . Data integration—that is, consolidating
information from heterogeneous databases—is no longer a
horrendously complex task, but one that is facilitated by
data standards (such as XML), the growth of the Web, and
fast and inexpensive data transmission capability.
Correspondingly, data dissemination through the Web and
40

COMMITTEE ON NAT’L STAT., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING
RESEARCH DATA (1985).
41
PANEL ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND DATA ACCESS, supra note 4.
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electronic mail is now free for all practical purposes.42
Such decreased costs benefit legitimate researchers, but they
also provide opportunities for “data snoopers”—individuals or
organizations that seek to identify individual respondents for a
variety of purposes that include curiosity, mischief, and marketing
as well as searching for criminals or terrorists. Data that are most
useful to legitimate researchers also have properties that make
individuals especially vulnerable to data snoopers (examples of
such data include detailed geographic information, repeated data
collections from the same subjects, and complete censuses rather
than small probability samples). All of these properties make it
easier to identify individuals even in a data file from which direct
identifiers, such as names and addresses, have been removed.
The second change is the development of new ways of
collecting information about individuals. For example, the use of
scanners at supermarkets permits stores to collect and share a
wealth of information about purchasing behavior and to link that to
the information provided on consumers’ credit applications and to
census data for small areas. The use of keycards in businesses and
government offices enables employers to track employee
movements precisely.43 So-called “black boxes” in new model
automobiles record and store information on seat belt use and
speed, but buyers are not always aware of these features.44 Other
kinds of information, such as biomarkers for various diseases and
even unique genetic information, are increasingly collected as part
of social surveys that also inquire into many details of individuals’
42

See PANEL ON DATA ACCESS, supra note 1. See also George T. Duncan,
Exploring the Tension Between Privacy and the Social Benefits of Governmental
Databases, in A LITTLE KNOWLEDGE: PRIVACY, SECURITY AND PUBLIC
INFORMATION AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 72 (Peter. M. Shane et al. eds., 2004)
(stating that “advances in information technology have sharply lowered the costs
of data capture, storage, integration and dissemination”).
43
EDWARD BALKOVICH, TORA K. BIKSON & GORDON BITKO, 9 TO 5: DO
YOU KNOW IF YOUR BOSS KNOWS WHERE YOU ARE? 11 (RAND 2005)
(discussing the use of Radio Frequency Identification access cards in the
workplace).
44
N.D. Bismarck, States Seek to Regulate ‘Black Boxes’ in Autos, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at 16.
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behavior.45
A great deal of care and thought is needed when such data are
released. For example, a map pinpointing the location of sample
members can, potentially, serve to identify those individuals;
knowing who is in the sample, in turn, greatly increases the ability
of intruders to locate those records in the data file, and thus to learn
things about them that the individual believed were available only
to the researchers.
The third change is the existence and increasing availability of
large databases containing information on hundreds of thousands,
sometimes millions, of individuals.46 These databases—such as
those maintained by Experian,47 for example—contain names and
addresses, and sometimes Social Security Numbers, as well as
information on a wide variety of individual characteristics, such as
income, education, race, marital status, and much more. Together
with sophisticated software for matching records electronically,
these databases provide the tools for matching data records from
which direct identifiers have been removed with other records that
have some identical data elements along with the direct identifiers.
This is essentially the method Dr. Sweeney used in the Illinois
Cancer Registry case discussed earlier.48 Among the technical
changes, too, are new ways of disguising data to maintain their
confidentiality, such as masking and multiple imputation, which
are discussed in a later section.
The final two developments that have increased the tension
between increasing access to research data and protecting
confidentiality have already been discussed. Changes in the legal
framework have placed a greater strain on the research system by
increasing the risk of confidentiality breaches (e.g., Patriot Act,
45

PANEL ON DATA ACCESS, supra note 1, at 60.
Latanya Sweeney, Information Explosion, in CONFIDENTIALITY,
DISCLOSURE, AND DATA ACCESS: THEORY AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS FOR
STATISTICAL AGENCIES 43 (P. Doyle et al. eds., 2001).
47
Experian, a credit bureau, maintains credit information on approximately
215 million U.S. consumers. See Experian Corporate Fact Sheet,
http://www.experian.com/corporate/factsheet.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2005).
48
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
46
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Shelby Amendment, and Data Quality Act) while simultaneously
increasing confidentiality protections (e.g., CIPSEA). Furthermore,
increased public concerns about privacy and confidentiality have
led to an increased reluctance to participate in statistical surveys or
to provide Social Security Numbers, which are often used to link
data from several surveys or to combine information from a survey
and administrative records.
III. PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY
A variety of threats to the confidentiality of research data exist.
Probably the most common is simple carelessness—not removing
names, addresses, or telephone numbers from questionnaires or
electronic data files, leaving cabinets unlocked, or not encrypting
files containing identifying information. Increased access to
research data is likely to heighten the risks stemming from
carelessness and ignorance unless adequate precautions are taken.
Less common but potentially more serious threats to
confidentiality are legal demands for identified data, either in the
form of a subpoena or as a result of a FOIA request. Also of
concern are instances of intrusion into government statistics by
other government agencies for law enforcement purposes.
Anderson and Seltzer, for example, have recently documented a
number of attempts to use Census Bureau data for such purposes
between 1910 and 1965.49
In addition to the legal attempts to obtain confidential
information described above, confidentiality may also be breached
as a result of illegal intrusions into the data. Such instances of
identity theft have become more prominent in the news in the last
ten years. For example, in 2005, the ChoicePoint Corporation, a
data warehouse, was duped by thieves posing as businessmen into
49

See Margo Anderson & William Seltzer, The Challenges of “Taxation,
Investigation, and Regulation:” Statistical Confidentiality and U.S. Federal
Statistics, 1910-1965 (2004) (paper prepared for Census Bureau Symposium,
America’s Scorecard: The Historic Role of the Census in an Ever-Changing
Nation, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 4-5, 2004),
available at http://www.uwm.edu/~margo/govstat/Challenges.pdf.
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selling hundreds of thousands of confidential records containing
sensitive personal information.
A final threat to data confidentiality is the possibility of
“statistical disclosure,” which refers to the re-identification of
individuals (or their attributes) as a result of an outsider’s matching
of survey data that has been stripped of explicit identifying
information, such as names and addresses, with information
available outside the survey. Although there are no known
instances of the confidentiality of research data having been
breached as a result of statistical disclosure, this is the risk that
government data collection agencies and other survey
organizations are currently most concerned about, and they are
increasingly taking steps to protect against this possibility.
What can researchers do to protect data confidentiality against
these threats? We discuss this under three headings: Development
of norms and best practices; protections against legal intrusions;
and protections against illegal intrusions.
A. Development of Norms and Best Practices
As noted above, the most likely reason for a breach of
confidentiality involving research data is ignorance or carelessness.
Laws and procedures designed to prevent confidentiality breaches
and punish their occurrence are not enough to combat breaches
caused by carelessness; they must be accompanied by internalized
norms of research ethics and fair information practices, as well as
practical knowledge of how to implement such policies.50 The
Panel on Data Access for Research Purposes has made three
specific recommendations in this area: 51
Rec. 16: Statistical agencies and survey organizations that
collect individually identifiable data should provide written
guidelines for confidentiality protection and training in
confidentiality practices and data management that guard
50

AL.,

For some practical suggestions along these lines, see R. M GROVES,
SURVEY METHODOLOGY, 358-59, 368-70 (2004).
51
PANEL ON DATA ACCESS, supra note 1, at 82-84.
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against disclosure for all staff who work with or have
access to such data.
Rec. 18: Training in ethical issues related to research,
including fair information practices, as well as principles
and practices related to research with human subjects,
should be part of the professional training of all those
involved in the design, collection, distribution, and use of
data obtained under pledges of confidentiality. Such
training should be updated at intervals after the end of
formal schooling.
Rec. 19: Professional associations should develop strong
codes of ethical conduct that reflect the need to protect the
confidentiality of personal data and make adherence to
these codes an integral part of their educational activities.
B. Protections Against Legal Intrusions
An example of a legal intrusion into research data is a
subpoena in a legal proceeding. Contingent valuation surveys, for
example, value a public good, such as clean air or clean water, by
asking respondents what they would be willing to pay for it. Such
surveys are sometimes done in order to establish the damages that
should be assessed in a man-made disaster, as in the case of the
Exxon Valdez oil spill. Defendants in such cases have an interest
in making sure that the survey was properly done, that the
interviews were actually conducted, and that no distortions took
place in the reporting of the results. At times, they have
subpoenaed the actual survey records.52 In one instance, the case
was settled before the data were to be produced; in two other
instances, the courts ordered the researchers to turn over raw data,
including respondent identifiers, to the defendants.53 Stanley
52

For a review of several such cases, see Stanley Presser, Informed
Consent and Confidentiality in Survey Research, 58 PUB. OPINION Q. 446, 44659 (1994).
53
Eliot Marshall, Court Orders ‘Sharing’ of Data Science, SCIENCE, July
16, 1993, at 284-86.
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Presser, in his article Informed Consent and Confidentiality in
Survey Research, discusses several actions that might be taken by
professional survey organizations, such as the American
Association for Public Opinion Research, to enhance protections of
confidentiality in such cases—for example, mandating the
destruction of identifiers in surveys designed for adversarial
proceedings.54 Another possibility is to verify the procedures used
without disclosing the identity of the respondents, for example by
allowing a disinterested survey expert to examine the interviews
and the procedures to make sure that they meet professional
standards.
FOIA requests are another source of legal intrusions into the
data; an example of this is the case of the Illinois Cancer Registry,
previously discussed. 55
At times, law enforcement agencies have requested data
collected under a promise of confidentiality by another agency. In
1917, for example, the Department of the Army asked the Census
Bureau for information about men between the ages of 21 and 30
who were suspected of not having registered for the recently
instituted draft. After a ruling by the Census Bureau’s Solicitor
General, the names of several hundred young men were turned
over to the courts, draft boards, and the Justice Department by the
Census Bureau, despite President Taft’s proclamation of
confidentiality prior to the decennial census.56 In 1947, the
54

For discussion on applicable judicial requirements, see Presser, supra
note 52.
55
S. Illinoisan v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 812 N.E.2d 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
56
Anderson & Seltzer, supra note 49. As Anderson and Seltzer tell the
story:
[O]fficials in the Provost Marshal General’s office and the local draft
boards wrestled with administrative procedures to counter resistance to
the draft registration and the draft. It soon became clear that the returns
from the 1910 census could provide information to confirm the names,
addresses and ages of individuals who might be suspected of not
complying with the draft registration. The possibility of such requests
frames the conflict between the commitment in Taft’s proclamation [of
confidentiality] and the requirements of modern war. Why should one
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Attorney General made a similar request for information about
suspected Communist sympathizers, but was denied.57
Two main defenses exist in law against the kinds of legal
intrusions discussed above: Certificates of Confidentiality, and the
recently enacted Confidential Information Protection and
Statistical Efficiency Act of 2002.
Certificates of Confidentiality are issued prospectively by the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to
agency of government prevent another agency of government from
doing its job? Why shouldn’t the individual level data be made
available to aid the war effort?
However, in seeking to supply such information, the Census
Director, Sam Rogers, knew he faced an obstacle. On June 22, 1917 he
asked for guidance from the Secretary of Commerce and explained:
I have received numerous requests from registration officials in
various parts of the United States to furnish them with information
from the census records, showing the ages of men who they
believe have failed to registered, although between the ages of 21
and 30.
He also knew that Taft’s proclamation guaranteed the individual data
would not be used for enforcement purposes. Nevertheless, he saw a
higher standard that outweighed the earlier pledge:
I believe that every branch of the Government, including this
bureau, should assist at the present time, so far as possible, in
securing a full registration. Accordingly, it is recommended that
the matter be taken up with the President, with the view to having
an order issued waiving the rigid rule laid down in Ex-President
Taft’s proclamation, and authorizing this Bureau to supply the
proper officials (both registration and Federal) who are in control
of the registration and prosecution of individuals who have failed
to register, with data from the census schedules, which may show
the ages of such individuals.
On June 25, the Commerce Department Acting Solicitor issued the
requested opinion. It gave the Census Director the authority to provide
names and ages to the registration authorities . . . . Vincent Barabba
noted in the 1970s that as a result of this opinion “personal information
for several hundred young men was released to courts, draft boards, and
the Justice Department.”
Id. at 7-8.
57
Id. at 29.
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researchers on sensitive topics, such as sexual behavior or illegal
drug use, whether federally funded or not.58 They may also be
issued by the National Institute of Justice for research supported by
the Department of Justice. Under a Certificate of Confidentiality, a
researcher may not be compelled “in any Federal, State, or local
civil, criminal, administrative, legislative, or other proceedings to
identify . . . the names or other identifying characteristics” of
research participants.59 The Certificate protects the identity of the
respondents, not the data themselves. To the best of my
knowledge, however, the effectiveness of a Certificate of
Confidentiality has not been tested in the courts.
The other main legal protection for confidential information,
CIPSEA,60 has already been discussed. It is rooted in the
distinction between administrative and statistical uses of data, and
it protects information collected by statistical agencies or their
agents under a pledge of confidentiality for exclusively statistical
purposes from being disclosed in identifiable form except with the
permission of the respondent.61 Like the Certificate of
Confidentiality, however, this law has not been tested in the courts.
C. Protections Against Illegal Intrusions
Identity Theft. The most visible example of illegal intrusions,
by far, is identity theft, estimated in one survey to have affected
more than 11 million Americans in 2003.62 For example, as
previously mentioned, confidential records at ChoicePoint, a data
broker, were recently sold to thieves posing as legitimate
businessmen. LexisNexis, another data broker, suffered similar
58

Public Health Service Act § 301(d), 42 U.S.C. § 241(d), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 100-607, sec. 163 (1988).
59
Effect of Confidentiality Certificate, 42 CFR § 2a.7 (2006).
60
See E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006). See supra note
16 and accompanying text.
61
See E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006).
62
Diane Hirte, Identity Theft Numbers are Skyrocketing, SHESHUNOFF.COM
(Feb.
2003),
at
http://www.sheshunoff.com/email/archive/
0203/oper_new1.html.
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losses when thieves stole legitimate passwords and login names.
ChoicePoint estimated that approximately 145,000 U.S. customers’
files were compromised, and CBS News reported on March 5,
2005, that at least 750 people were defrauded as a result.
LexisNexis said information on 32,000 U.S. customers was
stolen.63 Bank of America disclosed in February 2005 that it lost
data tapes containing the Social Security Numbers and home
addresses of the holders of 1.2 million government charge card
accounts, and more recently Citibank “lost” data tapes containing
similar information for some 3.9 million card holders when the
tapes disappeared during transfer by UPS to a secure storage site.64
A few days later, Mastercard International reported that more than
40 million credit card accounts of all brands might have been
exposed to fraud through a computer security breach at a payment
processing center.65
Improper Disclosure. Less visible, but equally disturbing, is
the improper release of confidential data. For example, in a 1993
Harris telephone survey, 27% of respondents said that medical
information about them had been improperly disclosed.66 A recent
Harris survey reported that only 14% of the sample gave the same
response in 2005,67 but drastic changes in the mode of the survey
and the sample make comparison difficult.
In terms of the number of people whose confidential
information was improperly disclosed, two airlines—Jet Blue and
63

Paul Roberts, Hackers Grab LexisNexis Info on 32,000 People, PC
WORLD (March 9, 2005), available at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/
0,aid,119953,00.asp.
64
CNN MONEY, Info on 3.9M Citigroup Customers Lost (June 6, 2005)
http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/06/news/fortune500/security_citigroup.
65
Eric Dash & Tom Zeller, Jr., Mastercard Says 40 Million Files Are Put
at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at A1.
66
Eleanor Singer, et al., Privacy of Health Care Data: What Does the
Public Know? How Much Do They Care?, in HEALTH CARE AND INFORMATION
ETHICS 401 (Audrey Chapman, ed., 1997).
67
PRIVACY & AMERICAN BUSINESS, Conference (testimony of Dr. Alan F.
Westin, Director of the Program on Information Technology, speaking on
Privacy and Health Information Technology), Washington, D.C. (Feb. 23,
2004), http://www.pandab.org/WestinHHS.ppt#342,5ImproperDisclosureof.
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Northwest—probably get the prize. In violation of their privacy
policies, the two airlines disclosed confidential information,
including names, addresses, and Social Security Numbers
belonging to millions of their passengers, in order to help the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Pentagon
develop systems designed to profile potential terrorists. The
systems were subsequently said to have been abandoned because
of privacy concerns.68 In March, 2005, the Inspector General of the
Department of Homeland Security blamed the Transportation
Security Administration for failing to monitor adequately at least
six airlines’ transfer of sensitive passenger information to private
companies and federal agencies in 2002 and 2003.69
Because none of these examples of illegal intrusion or
improper disclosure involve research data, the concern shown by
researchers and statistical agencies for protecting confidentiality
may seem excessive. Nevertheless, the visibility of security
breaches and other violations of privacy policies in the private
sector have made the public more skittish about cooperating in
legitimate research. Hence, government and academic researchers,
who are dependent on the public’s voluntary cooperation, take the
protection of confidential data very seriously.
There are two main ways of protecting research data against
illegal intrusion: one is to restrict the data—that is, to limit the
detail of the information that is released in order to reduce its
identifiability. The other is to restrict access to data whose original
detail has not been altered. Neither of these, of course, protects
against the other sources of confidentiality breaches discussed
above: carelessness, legal intrusions, and improper disclosure. And
so ironically, the very steps statistical agencies and other data
collection organizations can take to protect confidentiality—which
have the unintended consequence of making access to research
data by legitimate researchers more difficult—are unlikely to
68

Sara Kehaulani Goo, Confidential Data Used for Air Security Project,
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 17, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/ac2/wp-dyn/A26037-2004Jan17?language=printer.
69
Eric Lipton, Agency Partly to Blame in Misuse of Passenger Data,
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, at 14.
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reduce the confidentiality breaches that are known to occur most
often.
1. Restricting Data
The first step in restricting data is to remove obvious
identifiers—names, addresses, telephone numbers, Social Security
numbers and any other information that uniquely identifies an
individual. But removal of obvious identifiers is only the first step
in what has come to be known as a “disclosure limitation”
review.70
A review of data for purposes of disclosure limitation aims to
eliminate from the data file those records with unique values on
variables, as well as those with values that occur very infrequently.
For example, a black female judge between the ages of 40 and 45
in Pinellas County, Florida would be readily identifiable in a
survey even if her name and address were not part of the data
record. More generally, date of birth, together with relatively small
geography (such as county) and gender, is often enough to make
identification possible if the data are matched against publicly
available electronic files that contain names and addresses.71 Such
identifications are even easier if the intruder knows that the person
is actually a part of the sample. Hence, date of birth and small area
identifiers are routinely removed from data files intended for
public release.
In addition to removal of direct identifiers, there are two main
techniques for restricting data. One of these is called data masking;
the other uses statistical techniques to create synthetic data that

70

See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON DISCLOSURE LIMITATION METHODOLOGY,
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, WORKING
PAPER 22: REPORT ON STATISTICAL DISCLOSURE LIMITATION METHODOLOGY
(1994).
71
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP ON
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH FOR FEDERAL STATISTICS 36 (National
Academy Press 2000), available at http://www.nap.edu/html/itr_federal_stats/
ch2.html.
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retain most of the properties of the original data set.72
Data Masking. The goal of data masking is to reduce the
number of low-frequency cases in a data set (e.g., people earning
more than $250,000 a year) and/or to create ambiguity about them.
There are many ways of masking data. All of them make
identification more difficult but also reduce the usefulness of the
information disseminated. A general framework for analyzing the
joint impact of various disclosure limitation techniques on
disclosure risk and data utility is the risk-utility (R-U)
confidentiality map,73 which incorporates quantified measures of
disclosure risk as well as measures of data utility.74 More research,
however, is needed on how to optimize the disclosure limitationutility tradeoffs. Synthetic Data. The second technique for
restricting data is to create an alternative data set by statistically
modeling the original data records. In the most extreme version,
none of the new records correspond to a real individual, and in that
sense the statistically modeled “synthetic” data provide complete
protection for confidential information, although they do not
necessarily prevent an intruder from believing that he or she has
identified a real person.75
Research on synthetic data creation and modeling is proceeding
72

For excellent discussions of both of these techniques, see P. DOYLE, ET
CONFIDENTIALITY, DISCLOSURE, AND DATA ACCESS: THEORY AND
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS FOR STATISTICAL AGENCIES (2001); Special Issue:
Disclosure Limitation Methods for Protecting the Confidentiality of Statistical
Data 14, J. OF OFFICIAL STAT. (Stephen E. Fienberg & Leon C. R. J.
Willenborg, eds., 1998). See also Jerome P. Reiter, New Approaches to Data
Dissemination: A Glimpse into the Future?, 17 CHANCE 12 (2004).
73
G.T. Duncan, et al., Disclosure Risk vs. Data Utility through the R-U
Confidentiality Map in Multivariate Settings 1-2 (Working paper, 2003),
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/wpapers/retrievePDF?id=2005-16.
74
See G.T. Duncan & D. Lambert, Disclosure-Limited Data
Dissemination, 81 J. OF THE AM. STAT. ASS’N 10 (1986); G.T. Duncan & D.
Lambert, The Risk of Disclosure for Microdata, 7 J. OF BUS. & ECON. STAT., 207
(1989); D. Lambert, Measures of Disclosure Risk and Harm, 9 J. OF OFFICIAL
STAT. 313 (1993).
75
D.B. Rubin, Statistical Disclosure Limitation, 9 J. OFFICIAL STAT. 461
(1993); T.E. Raghunathan, et al., Multiple Imputation for Statistical Disclosure
Limitation, 19 J. OF OFFICIAL STAT. 1 (2003); Reiter, supra note 72.
AL.,
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rapidly. Researchers are interested in relationships among variables
or attributes, not the identity of individuals who happen to exhibit
those attributes. At present, synthetic data are capable of
reproducing many of the relationships between data elements in
the original observations—for example, those between education
and occupation or education and income. But higher-order
interactions—for example, among race, gender, education, and
income—are modeled with less accuracy and precision. To
improve the ability of synthetic data to reproduce accurately these
complex relationships among variables, researchers are
experimenting with imputing only some, rather than all, of the
variables in the original data set. Understandably, such partially
synthetic data sets are also subject to some, albeit small, disclosure
risk.76 To date, various studies of the usefulness of simulated data
suggest that it is a promising approach for various kinds of
inferential analysis.77
One advantage of synthetic data over data masking methods is
their potential for estimating various sources of error. Some true
relationship exists in the population between, say, education and
income. The observed relationship in a given sample is just one
random sample from that population distribution. Synthetic data
created from the observed data can be thought of as simply another
random sample from the population. Therefore, as Reiter puts it,
“the user analyzing these synthetic samples is essentially analyzing
alternative samples from the population,”78 and the synthetic data
on average will have similar characteristics as the observed data.
Because this is true on average, and not for any particular synthetic
data set, researchers using such data must use multiple data sets
(hence, “multiple imputation”) both to estimate the true values of
the variables of interest and—equally important—to estimate the

76

Reiter, supra note 72, at 16.
See, e.g., J.M. Abowd & S.D. Woodcock, Disclosure Limitation in
Longitudinal Linked Data, in CONFIDENTIALITY, DISCLOSURE, AND DATA
ACCESS: THEORY AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS FOR STATISTICAL AGENCIES
215-78 (Pat Doyle et al. eds., 2001).
78
Reiter, supra note 72, at 15.
77
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sources of error associated with them.79
2. Restricting Access
To cope with the loss of accuracy and precision that results
from masking and imputation, research data are also made
available in a variety of modes that retain the original identifying
detail but restrict access to those who can meet certain criteria.
Some of the ways in which confidential data are made available
are (1) in special research data centers, to which researchers must
travel;80 (2) through licensing agreements, which permit access in
the researcher’s home institution;81 and (3) through remote
electronic access.82 All of these modes of access stipulate that the
researcher must meet certain requirements, which vary in their
stringency. Most of these alternatives require approved research
plans and license agreements, which permit researchers to work
with the data at their own institution, require a data protection plan
and, ordinarily, an agreement to permit auditing the researcher’s
adherence to this plan. Research data centers and remote access
involve scrutiny of researchers’ output for possible breaches of
data confidentiality. All access modes require researchers to sign a
confidentiality agreement, and they all entail penalties for the
willful violation of such an agreement. NCES, for example,
imposes a fine up to $250,000 and/or five years imprisonment for
such a violation (a Class E felony), as does CIPSEA. The Health
and Retirement Study’s penalties for willful disclosure include
79

See Reiter, supra note 72, at 15; Raghunathan, supra note 75, at 2-3.
For example, the Census Bureau currently sponsors eight Research Data
Centers (RDCs), with a ninth scheduled to open in late 2005. The National
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) and the Agency for Health Research and
Quality each maintain one RDC, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
maintains three. PANEL ON DATA ACCESS, supra note 1, at 29.
81
Licensing was first established in 1989 by the NCES. Id. at 33. Other
agencies that have licensing procedures include BLS and the Division of
Science Resources Statistics of the National Science Foundation. Id.
82
Monitored remote access is currently implemented in four federal
statistical agencies: NCES, NCHS, the Census Bureau, and the Economic
Research Service in the Department of Agriculture. Id. at 31.
80
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forfeiture by the investigator—and possibly the investigator’s
institution—of all current federal funding, and denial of future
funding by the sponsoring agency.83
Like methods of restricting data, which curtail the usefulness of
the information made available, methods of restricting access also
impose certain costs on the investigator. Gaining access to
confidential data may involve inconvenience, delay, and financial
costs, since remote access modalities as well as research data
centers require the payment of a fee to defray the expense of
maintaining the service or facility. In an effort to provide better
access to such data, the Panel on Data Access for Research
Purposes has proposed a number of recommendations designed to
improve methods of restricting data, on the one hand, and of
facilitating restricted access to detailed confidential data, on the
other. For example, with respect to access, the panel has
recommended that the Census Bureau broaden the interpretation of
the criteria used to give researchers access to its confidential
data;84 that the statistical agencies sponsor research on costeffective means of providing secure access through remote data
access mechanisms;85 that the use of licensing agreements for
confidential data be expanded;86 and that such agreements include
provision for auditing compliance to security procedures and
penalties for their violation.87 With respect to improving methods
of restricting data to limit its identifiability, the panel has
recommended that agencies responsible for data collection should
sponsor or conduct research on (1) developing measures for
quantifying disclosure risk; (2) estimating the effect on disclosure
risk of adding selected variables from confidential files to public
use files; (3) estimating and improving the utility-disclosure
limitation tradeoffs of alternative disclosure limitation methods,
including synthetic data; and (4) developing disclosure limitation
83

For further discussion of restricted access modes, see PANEL
ACCESS, supra note 1, at 31.
84
Id. at 77 (Recommendation 9).
85
Id. at 78 (Recommendation 10).
86
Id. at 79 (Recommendation 11).
87
Id. at 80 (Recommendation 13).
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methods for establishment (business) data.88
CONCLUSION
This article has tried to communicate a number of points. First,
there is an inherent tension between providing easy access to
research data and protecting the confidentiality of those data.
Second, increasingly, the courts will be called on to adjudicate the
competing claims of those who want broader access, and those
who want greater protection for privacy and confidentiality. Some
of these claims may involve questions of national security, which
will only complicate matters further. Third, a democratic society
demands wide access to high-quality research data, but good data
require the public’s continued willingness to provide information,
and to do so honestly and accurately. Fourth, such cooperation, in
turn, depends on the public’s confidence that their privacy and
confidentiality will be respected and that they will not be harmed
as a result of their voluntary cooperation in research. Finally,
managing the tension between access to research data and
protecting the confidentiality of those data requires recourse to
technical, administrative, and legal solutions, some of them not yet
invented. But even with the tools we have now, it is possible to do
a great deal, if not everything, to satisfy both sides of the
controversy.

88

Id. at 72 (Recommendation 5).

